Domei 4.dom.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

328. American Embassy is Responsible for Expose

Minister Miura also reported on October 14, 1941 that according to a Japanese Naval investigation the recent expose had resulted from guidance offered by the American Embassy, which appeared to be well informed in this matter.[879] In a press conference on October 13, 1941 Foreign Minister Padilla had Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire stated that either the Military or Naval Attaches of a certain Far Eastern country, or the Commercial Secretary, had participated in the affair. Although the rank of the persons concerned was regrettable, the case would now come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and the guilty parties would be punished severely since the Mexican government would take a firm stand in this matter.[880]

329. Japanese Military Attache Requests Expansion of Intelligence Facilities in the United States Since it seemed evident to Japanese representatives in Mexico that war between Japan

and the United States would break out at any time, they advised the establishment of additional facilities to acquire military intelligence in the United States. In the future it would probably be extremely difficult for Japanese agents, either in the United States or in South America, to carry on espionage as formerly planned. In view of the fact that after and even before the outbreak of war Japanese agents would be unable to get intelligence concerning the details of military operations, the Japanese Military Attache in Mexico advised that additional advisors, particularly with air and technical backgrounds, he sent immediately to the attache's office in the United States to increase facilities for gathering intelligence.[881]

330. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Criticizes Minister Miura for Requesting Information Concerning Japanese Negotiations

A dispatch evidently created a misunderstanding in the Japanese Foreign Office, for on October 16, 1941 Minister Miura defended himself by saying that the message in question emanated purely from his interest in his country's welfare, and if the message were not read from that point of view it would not make sense. He resented being considered forward though admitting that he might have been reckless in his choice of words.[882]

Minister Miura pointed out that the Imperial Portraits had already been sent home in preparation for war, and requested that officials in the field be given permission to make their final preparations.

According to a circular which had been sent to Foreign Office representatives, Foreign Minister Toyoda had declared that: (1) the Foreign Office was carrying on negotiations with the United States, and (2) that these negotiations had been approached on the theory that they could be reconciled with the Tripartite Alliance. Urging that Japanese diplomats be advised of the facts by some government code, since not to do so would be to deceive them, their staffs, and resident nationals, Minister Miura said that everyone knew the negotiations had failed.[883]

331. Minister Miura Protests the Transfer of Translator Fukushima

To a suggestion of the Japanese Foreign Office that Mr. Mokichi Fukushima, official interpreter of the Japanese Legation in Mexico be transferred, Minister Miura voiced his opposition. Considering Mr. Fukushima's wide acquaintance with persons of high rank in Mexico, and his invaluable services as an interpreter in important conversations, Minister Miura considered him indispensable in making contacts and in the smooth and prompt handling of business. With Japanese-American relations now reaching a very tense stage, business in the

[879] Ibid.
[880] III, 625.
[881] III, 626. This message was not translated until May 3, 1945.
[882] III, 627-628.
[883] III, 629.

[185]

Japanese Legation would become more and more complicated and delicate. For these reasons, Minister Miura asked that Mr. Fukushima's transfer be postponed for the time being at least.[884]

[884] III, 630.

[186]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(e) Japanese-South American Relations

332. Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro Arrives in South America

During the period from August 6 to October 17, 1941 Japan became increasingly interested in South American countries, not only to keep informed of the trends of public opinion there, but also to derive intelligence regarding the United States. In pursuit of this information, Japanese representatives regularly visited their colleagues in South American capitals.

Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro, accredited to the ABC powers left Miami, Florida on August 9, 1941 for Cali, Colombia via Balboa; when he would arrive in Santiago, Chile on August 11, 1941.[885]

333. Freezing Legislation Adversely Affects Japan

Japanese officials were much concerned over the freezing legislation put into effect by certain South American countries. Since several marus were ready to depart from Japan to pick up various products from South American trading posts, Tokyo urged on August 12, 1941 that Japanese representatives in South America confer with authorities of the Yokohama Specie Bank in order to obtain products critically needed in Japan.

The Noto Maru which would not sail until the completion of these conferences between the Japanese Ministers and bank and company representatives was scheduled to transport silk, cotton and woolen goods, porcelain wear and staple fibre totaling approximately 15,460,000 yen, to the South American ports.[886]

334. Japanese Representatives Visit South America

On August 18, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Japanese representatives in Panama, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Argentina that Secretary Hiroichi Takagi, a diplomatic courier, would arrive in their countries by Sanagra plane between August 23 and 26, 1941.[887]

Two Japanese Army officers, Lt. Colonel Suzuki and Lt. Colonel Ito were to sail aboard the Argentina on August 20, 1941 and were expected to arrive in Tokyo by September 10, 1941. The Japanese Military Attache in Washington stated that a certain item would probably not be dispatched in Lt. Colonel Suzuki's care, since it had been loaned out to the San Francisco Military Affairs Society. Lt. Colonel Suzuki would, however, have information concerning the reservations aboard a certain ship.[888]

335. Minister Yamagata Reports Maru Schedules

On August 20, 1941 Minister Kiyoshi Yamagata at Santiago, in a message to Rio de Janeiro, reported that the Sakido Maru was leaving the port of Coquimbo on August 25, 1941, the Asuka Maru would depart from Valparaiso about August 30, 1941 and the Norfolk Maru was to leave Valparaiso on September 15, 1941. All of these were freighters with limited accommodations for passengers.[889]

[885] III, 631-632.
[886] III, 633.
[887] III, 634.
[888] III, 635.
[889] III, 636.

[187]

336. Mr. Shinohara Makes Conflicting Travel Plans

Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Washington and secretly in charge of Japanese espionage in the United States, accompanied by Diet Member Rikour Shinohara was scheduled to arrive in Buenos Aires on August 9, 1941 via the Pan American Airways. From Buenos Aires the two officials would depart from Santiago on August 17, 1941 arriving in Lima on August 18, 1941.[890]

Mr. Shinohara, who had previously visited the United States, was planning a trip to Germany. Arriving at Santiago on August 18, 1941 he enlisted the aid of the Japanese diplomats in that city to secure his passage to Germany via Lisbon. If it were possible to go to Germany, he desired to obtain permission from the State Department to reenter the United States.

In the meantime, the Japanese staff at Santiago was trying to persuade Mr. Shinohara to return to Japan on the Heiyo Maru, sailing on August 23, 1941, rather than to complete his proposed trip to Germany. Both plans awaited the State Department's decision.[891]

Replying on August 20, 1941 that it was almost impossible to obtain seats on the Lisbon plane, Ambassador Nomura recommended that Mr. Shinohara be advised to return to Japan on the Heiyo Maru. In spite of the fact that his application for entry to the United States had been referred immediately to the State Department, no response had been forthcoming as yet.[892]

It would appear that Mr. Shinohara was having difficulty in making up his mind for a dispatch from Panama to Washington on August 30, 1941 intimated that Mr. Shinohara had decided to return to Japan aboard the Heiyo Maru, leaving Manzanillo on September 20, 1941, and desired to visit Washington beforehand. Since his application to the American Embassy in Peru for entry into the United States had not been approved as yet, Minister Masatoshi Akiyama asked that the permit be sent to Panama.[893] However, on this same day, another dispatch from Minister Akiyama in Panama to Ambassador Ishii in Rio de Janeiro requested that space be obtained for Mr. Shinohara aboard the Italian plane leaving Brazil for Rome on September 15, 1941.[894] On September 10, 1941 Ambassador Ishii replied that both on September 15 and 16, 1941 seats were available aboard a Lati plane leaving Recife, and requested that Mr. Shinohara indicate his choice.[895]

337. Secretary Terasaki Establishes Intelligence Net in South America

As a result of the conference of Mr. Terasaki with the Japanese Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Tokyo was informed on August 22, 1941 that the establishment of an intelligence network in Latin America had been proposed to secure information in the United States. Spies would be placed within the United States, American propaganda as revealed in printed matter and radio broadcasts would be analyzed and intelligence secured from sources in Latin America would be collected and evaluated.[896]

339. Japanese Representatives Visit South American Countries

On September 2, 1941 Naval Attache Shigehiro in Buenos Aires informed the Lima Consulate that the Naval inspection party which had been scheduled to leave Argentina on the Heiyo Maru was unable to make connections, and was cancelling its reservations.[898] On Sep-

[890] III, 637.
[891] III, 638.
[892] III, 639.
[893] III, 640.
[894] III, 641.
[895] III, 642.
[896] III, 643.
[898] III, 645.

[188]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

tember 6, 1941 Ambassador Itaro Ishii in Rio de Janeiro informed the Japanese representative in Lima that Secretary Kudo, who wished to make an observation trip, would arrive in La Paz on September 12 and Lima on September 16, 1941.[899]

On September 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda instructed his representative in Buenos Aires that Mr. Mizukawa and Mr. Samurai Kosaki, telegraphic officials carrying secret papers and probably a cipher machine, would arrive there on October 15, 1941 aboard the Toa Maru. A safe for the office in Buenos Aires had also been entrusted to the captain of the Toa Maru.[900]

Another message from Mr. Toyoda informed Japanese representatives in Santiago that Mr. Kosaka would arrive in Valparaiso on the Toa Maru on October 6, 1941 carrying secret documents. The Foreign Minister urged that prompt dissemination be made of the information which Courier Kosaka was bringing to Santiago.[901]

When the Toa Maru sailed from Buenos Aires, it was expected that Mr. Ebizuka, who had been engaged in intelligence activities, would be aboard, bound for his new post.[902]

Aboard the Toa Maru, as assistant to Mr. Kosaka, the Telegraphic Secretary, was a Mr. Kusano, carrying the passport of a diplomatic courier. Although he was not to be placed on the diplomatic list, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that the Brazilian government be requested to approve his employment in the office at Rio de Janeiro.[903]

Since Mr. Kosaka, who was scheduled to arrive on the Toa Maru in Rio de Janeiro around October 13, 1941, planned to continue to North America, the Foreign Minister asked that steamship reservations be made for him, and that an American passport be procured.[904]

340. Japanese Espionage Network Begins Operations

In line with the establishment of an efficient Japanese spy organization in South America on August 22, 1941 by Mr. Terasaki, the Japanese intelligence coordinator for the Americas, all Japanese offices in North America were ordered to give their immediate attention to the selection of qualified espionage agents. Among the spies was a seaman who was to be placed with some prominent steamship company servicing North American ports.

Foreseeing difficulties in selecting reliable individuals and in checking information derived from foreign countries, Mr. Terasaki emphasized the necessity of Japan's spending vast sums to procure men and administer the whole intelligence network. Combating American counterespionage activities presented a problem since F.B.I. agents were known to be attempting to gain the confidence of those employed in the office of the Axis nations. He urged, therefore, that all Japanese agents be selected with care.

Each Japanese office in South America was to be equipped with radio sets capable of receiving United States' domestic broadcasts. Moreover, a central listening post would be located possibly in Brazil, where a secretary proficient in English shorthand would be on duty at all times.[905] It was learned later that American broadcasts would not reach beyond 1,000 miles. This made it impossible to establish a post either at Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro to listen to broadcasts made in the United States.[906]

Subscriptions to American papers and magazines were to be procured in the name of a South American for analysis by trained Japanese agents. Important spy centers were to be located in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, the latter country was of importance be-

[899] III, 646.
[900] III, 647.
[901] III, 648.
[902] III, 649.
[903] III, 650.
[904] III, 651.
[905] III, 652.
[906] III, 653.

[189]

cause of its nearness to the Panama Canal. It would be necessary, therefore, to enlarge the telegraphic sections of all the Japanese offices and to use the intelligence sources supplied by the local Domei news agency, special correspondents and Spanish and Portugese language correspondents. Japanese merchants would be employed to keep the organization informed of economic conditions in the United States. If the Axis diplomatic staffs were ordered out of the country before the Japanese, their German and Italian informants would be hired. Not only were Latin American spies to be used, but also those who lived in Spain and Portugal, since it would be possible, should Mexico enter the war, to relay information from Mexico to Spain where it could be retransmitted to Japan.[907]

341. Tripartite Powers Agree to Reciprocal Transportation of Diplomatic Material

By September 18, 1941 Japan, Germany and Italy had entered into a reciprocal agreement in regard to transporting diplomatic material and documents to and from American ports. Responsibility for transporting the documents varied according to the route.[908]

All contacts between Japan and Chile would be made by Japanese steamers and couriers and diplomatic pouch mail would be sent from Chile to Brazil. Permission had been secured to dispatch one courier a month between Brazil, Argentina and Chile.[909]

342. Japan Plans to Evacuate Its Nationals

Japan was preparing for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from all South American capitals. On September 20, 1941 Tokyo directed that Japanese residents, who were capable of maintaining themselves after economic relations had been severed, should not be evacuated. In addition, those whose incomes and livelihood were purely local in origin were to remain. Only Japanese residents of official status, those who had relations with Japanese industrial concerns, and those who were destitute, would be evacuated.[910]

Minister Goscoe Ohgimi in Caracas, Venezuela informed Tokyo on September 22, 1941 that all Japanese in Venezuela desired to remain, and that there were no destitute persons among them.[911] In Brazil, however, there were thirty-eight persons returning to Japan, including two officials, twenty-one destitute nationals and fifteen teachers,[912] who had been affected by Minister Anibal Hara's announcement on August 30, 1941 that subsidies for teachers and indigent Japanese nationals in Brazil were to be abolished owing to lack of funds.[913] If the diplomatic situation became more critical it was expected that approximately 180 officials and leaders would return to Japan.[914]

343. Japan Considers Using German Funds in South America

On September 22, 1941 Tokyo advised its representatives in South America concerning German funds in South America. Although its trade balance with South America had been unfavorable before the war, Germany planned to secure funds in South American branches of the Reichsbank to use in defraying expenses of its officials.

Germany also had decided to requisition the accounts of private German citizens, borrow on interest, exchange secretly the currency of various South American countries and send it abroad,[915] and, finally, sell German-owned bullion in South America. Since Ambassador Ishii

[907] III, 652.
[908] III, 654.
[909] III, 655.
[910] III, 656.
[911] III, 657.
[912] III, 658.
[913] III, 659.
[914] III, 658.
[915] III, 660.

[190]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

believed that this would produce a considerable sum, he suggested that Germany's permission be obtained to use these funds in paying Japanese officials in South America.[916] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

344. Japan Imposes New Censorship Restrictions

On October 4, 1941 Japan issued two new orders, one a temporary order for postal control and the other a Communications Department order. The first order announced the powers of the Minister of Communications in time of war or emergency to issue an order for the (a) prohibition or restriction of mailing (b) censorship of mail and (c) prohibition of delivery of mail.

The second order provided for the prohibition of the use of codes and ciphers, secret ink, Braille, and other methods of secret communications, as well as the mailing of private post cards and double sealed envelopes destined for foreign countries.

In addition, it required that the sender's address be indicated. Mail destined for foreign countries was not to be stamped, previously, but was to have the postage attached so that the matter could be mailed at the post office. Mail to and from foreign diplomatic offices in Japan would be excepted from this order by the various countries concerned unless a Japanese request for reciprocity relaxing in their censorship rule was denied.[917]

345. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Japan's Foreign Policy

In a message to Japanese representatives in South America, Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 9, 1941 discussed Japan's foreign policy in respect to the international situation. He confirmed the principles of the Tripartite Pact which he said had been founded with one purpose—that of preventing the spread of the European war and establishing world peace.

However, since the war had already spread throughout Europe it was now Japan's primary purpose to remove the causes for war between Japan and America by negotiating with America. However, as far as Japan was concerned, there was no change in its attitude to the Tripartite Pact; it was still attempting to settle the China incident, establish a co-prosperity sphere in Asia, prevent the spread of the war, ensure peace in the Pacific area, and, at the same time, prevent American participation in the war.[918]

346. Japan Plans to Sabotage American-Bolivian Trade Activities

On October 10, 1941 Tokyo announced that it had learned from an interested commercial concern that Bolivia was now considering an agreement to supply the United States exclusively with all kinds of metals. Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested to Minister Tatsuki Sakamoto in Lima that it should not be impossible for Japan to forestall the American-Bolivian agreement and its supply of materials by encouraging the Mitsui Company to negotiate with the Bolivian government for a "barter" agreement. Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that he be informed of the outcome of the American-Bolivian conferences so that Japan could decide its future action.[919]

347. Japan Requires Military Registration of its Nationals

Japanese military authorities had issued regulations requiring the registration of all nationals becoming eligible for military service during 1942. These persons were to register before November 30, 1941 with local authorities at whatever place their respective families maintained a residence.

[916] III, 661.
[917] III, 662.
[918] III, 663.
[919] III, 664.

[191]

On October 16, 1941 Tokyo expressed the belief that many Japanese nationals in South America, who were subject to military duty, were concerned over the question of reporting in time, owing to the uncertainty of the mails. Advice was asked as to the proper position to take in this regard, but Tokyo warned that this registration could not be postponed.[920]

(a) Argentina

348. Minister Tomii Warns Tokyo of Insecure Telephone Communications

In a message to Tokyo on August 16, 1941 Minister Tomii warned the Foreign Office against permitting Japanese commercial firms to transmit confidential information over the telephone, since it was well known that the local telephone company in Buenos Aires was making transcriptions of all conversations transmitted between Japan and Argentina. He felt that certain matters which an unnamed business concern in Japan was telephoning to Argentina could prove very embarrassing if disclosed to the public. Since it was more difficult to control telephone conversations than telegraphic communications, Minister Tomii urged that both private and governmental conversations be supervised so that leakage of secret information could be avoided. Representatives of the Axis nations were quite disturbed at the time because of an Argentinian investigation into Nazi activities.[921]

349. Japanese Minister Stresses Argentina's Desire for Neutrality

In a message on August 20, 1941 Minister Tomii advised Tokyo concerning the trend of public opinion in Argentina. During a speech made by Argentina's President, Ramon S. Castillo, to the graduating class of the University of Jurisprudence at Buenos Aires, the President cautioned that Argentina must be on its guard against those of its nationals who were in close touch with the German Embassy. On the other hand, he warned the pro-British and pro-American factions must not use force against Axis sympathizers.

The newspapers with British and American backing, primarily the Prensa and the Nacione, had opposed President Castillo's speech as arousing confusion in the minds of Argentinians and creating a diversity of opinion among the people. The Japanese Minister then revealed that the Argentina House Committee investigating Nazi activities had authorized the confiscation of 83 boxes containing Axis printed propaganda which had arrived on the Hana Maru on August 8, 1941.[922]

350. Japanese Minister Says Argentina Favors the United States

On September 18, 1941 Minister Tomii informed Japan concerning the persistent efforts of the United States to win over Argentina to the Anglo-American side. Referring to a mass meeting which had been held under the auspices of Argentina labor groups, and also to a bill which had been presented in the Lower House requesting the government of Argentina to support the Roosevelt-Churchill program, Minister Tomii said that the American Congress had invited the Argentina Lower House to send a group of representatives to the United States.

In view of the fact that the time was approaching for an Argentina election, Minister Tomii believed that the minority party was bringing up the question of international policy in an attempt to attack American "pressure" upon those in power. Furthermore, the minority group asserted that the Fascist Party as well as Argentina leaders in economic and military affairs were being softened by United States' "dollar diplomacy".

[920] III, 665.
[921] III, 666.
[922] III, 667.

[192]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

According to Minister Tomii, the Argentina government wished to obtain military supplies from the United States and was anxious to increase its exports to that country; consequently, it would be in favor of maintaining great amity toward the United States.[923]

Minister Tomii pointed out that the situation had become delicate for although acting President Castillo had resolutely upheld a neutrality policy, the Argentina Minister of War, who had recently attended an international celebration at Brazil, was currently attending a similar celebration in Chile, apparently for the purpose of exchanging opinions with the A.B.C. powers regarding a unified international policy.

Although the policy was still not known on September 18, 1941, Minister Tomii surmised that the A.B.C. powers would attempt to maintain peace in southern South America by cooperation with the United States. This theory was also held by those close to President Castillo.[924] In view of this situation the daily operations of the investigating committee against Nazi activities were expected to increase. However, Mr. Tomii did not expect that Italy or Japan would be effected.[925]

351. Minister Tomii Protests the Smuggling of a Radio Transmitter into Argentina

Learning that a radio transmitter was being brought to Buenos Aires by a Japanese Naval Attache, who was aboard the Toa Maru, Minister Tomii immediately warned Tokyo concerning the inadvisability of such a move. He stated than when informed of this plan he had conferred with the Naval Attache in Buenos Aires as to the Navy's motive, and had been told that it was hoped to use the transmitter once or twice subsequent to, and in the event of, severing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The Japanese warned Tokyo that the use of radio transmitters might cause considerable difficulties should war between the United States and Japan break out, if Argentina remained neutral. In that case, it was clear that Argentina as well as all other South American countries would be more dependent upon Great Britain and the United States than ever before.[926]

Minister Tomii emphasized that in view of recent scientific developments it would be simple for Argentina, Britain or the United States to discover the use of a Japanese transmitter. A grave diplomatic scandal would result from a belligerent country using a neutral nation as a base for military operations. Critical relations between Japan and Argentina would become unavoidable.

In mentioning the foiled Nazi plot to take over the Argentina government, Minister Tomii stated that Argentina customs officials had become very strict. Therefore, it would be difficult to transport the transmitter into the country, and it would be equally dangerous to maintain it there.[927] The conspiracy to which the Japanese Minister referred had taken place on September 23, 1941. It involved certain air force officials stationed at Cordova and Paruna. In advising Japan of the plot, Minister Tomii explained that although little had come of the seditious activities and national accord had been restored, increased measures had been undertaken to ensure the safety of the Argentina government.[928]

352. Argentina Minority Criticizes Anti-Axis Trend

The minority party in Argentina had become strongly antagonistic toward what it termed "government dictatorship", and was greatly aroused over the question of renouncing the German Ambassador. It also resented the existence of Anglo-American influence in administrative circles, and planned to stop the building in Argentina of military bases for the joint defense

[923] III, 668.
[924] III, 669.
[925] III, 670.
[926] III, 671.
[927] Ibid.
[928] III, 672.

[193]

of the western hemisphere.[929] The administration replied that diplomatic prerogatives belonged to the government alone, and influential circles in the Assembly supported this statement. According to the Japanese Minister this was but one aspect of the increased bitter political strife in the country.[930]

On October 6, 1941 President Castillo, while attending a religious ceremony in Rosairo, re-emphasized that the Argentina people must remain distinctly neutral. President Castillo assured the people that various external and internal problems would be settled in compliance with Argentina's needs and interests, and definite steps were being developed in support of neutrality. In keeping with the new plan, foreign residents in Argentina, although maintaining connections with belligerent countries, would not be questioned as long as they respected Argentina traditions.[931]

353. Joint Japanese-Argentina Trade Conference Is Advocated

On September 28, 1941 Minister Tomii who had reported previously concerning the attitude of Argentina authorities regarding Japanese ships, warned Tokyo that the Tokai Maru, anchored in the Buenos Aires harbor, was experiencing difficulty in obtaining enough fuel for the return trip.[932]

Conferring with the Argentina Trade Bureau Director in Buenos Aires, Minister Tomii learned on October 8, 1941 that Argentina had not decided on a definite policy for import and export trade. Argentina was finding it difficult to obtain supplies of tin, tin plate, aluminum, antimony, iron plate, jute, silk thread, rayon, and especially fuel oil, and because of the shortage of power some factories had been forced to close. Therefore, the Argentina Trade Bureau Chief suggested that if Japan were having similar difficulties in obtaining raw materials, a conference for the exchange of necessary goods should be called.

Since the trade of both countries was suffering from the present shortage of ships, it was suggested that Japan continue its shipping schedules in order to induce Argentina to share its supply of fuel oil with Japan.[933] The combination of American freezing laws and Argentina currency control was causing Japanese businessmen much concern.[934]

(b) Brazil

354. Tokyo Seeks Evidence in Brazil Against Japanese Journalist

Mr. Tadao Mitsuura of the Asahi newspaper was arrested in Japan because of suspicious actions, and Tokyo desired to obtain a letter he had written to a person in Sao Paulo. Foreign Minister Toyoda in his message to Sao Paulo requested that the Japanese Minister obtain this evidence. If the Japanese Minister expected that the recipient of the letter would refuse to hand it over on the basis that it might compromise Mr. Mitsuura, he was instructed on August 12, 1941 to request competent Brazilian authorities to intercept the letter and release it to him.[935]

355. Colonel Uchinomiya Leaves Japan for Post in Brazil

On August 26, 1941 Tokyo announced that Colonel Naokata Uchinomiya was departing on the Toa Maru for his new post as Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Brazil.[936]

[929] III, 673.
[930] III, 674.
[931] III, 675.
[932] III, 676.
[933] III, 677-678.
[934] III, 679.
[935] III, 680.
[936] III, 681.

[194]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

356. United States Official Advise Brazil on Purchase of Axis Ships

In regard to the sale of Axis ships interned in Brazilian harbors, Ambassador Ishii reported in a message to Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that Germany appeared to be holding out for payment in foreign money. He added that the presidents of the Moore-McCormack Import Bank had recently arrived in Rio de Janeiro to confer with Brazilian officials in connection with the sale of the Nazi vessels.[937]

357. Japanese Army Negotiates for Purchase of Brazilian Diamonds

On September 16, 1941 the General Affairs Department of the Japanese government informed its representatives in Rio de Janeiro that the Japanese War Ministry was sending 150,000 yen for the purchase of diamonds. The Japanese War Ministry also wished information concerning the possibility of acquiring high grade mica and quartz.[938]

358. Japan Promotes Propaganda Activities

In regard to the dissemination of Japanese propaganda in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii reported on September 12, 1941 that an agreement had been reached between Domei officials and the Director of the South American Newspaper Bureau to permit Domei news broadcasts. There had been no objections to the wave length but Domei had been requested to use more power.

Since Japanese language reports had little appeal in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii requested the appointment of a special commentator to discuss current world events in Portuguese.[939]

Although he had stated that propaganda in the Japanese language was of little value in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii reported that he had disseminated this material through official channels to Japanese nationals living in the interior who were under the jurisdiction of this office. Translation of this same propaganda was being published on the Sao Paulo Correo Paulistano and the Brazil Asahi. Until arrangements could be made for permission to use a special correspondent for English text propaganda, the Japanese were supplying various newspapers with Stefani dispatches which up to this time had not been used to any great extent.[940]

359. Japan Learns of Portugal's Plans to Protect Atlantic Possessions

On October 10, 1941 Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo of secret reports regarding the Portuguese situation. According to the German Ambassador to Brazil, the Portuguese government, a few months before, had requested that Brazil assume protection of Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic in the event that Germany or the United States threatened to occupy them, or should Portugal itself be invaded by Germany and its government find it necessary to flee to Brazil.

However, since the Brazilian government had close relations with the United States, it said that it could not accept this responsibility, if the United States were to take over the islands. On the other hand, in the event that Portugal were invaded by any other power, Brazil said that protection of the islands would be undertaken through Pan-American cooperation, with Brazil assigned the role of "symbolic protection".[941] No response had been received as yet from the Portuguese government, and though it was still a matter of conjecture as to what Brazil meant by "symbolic protection", the German Ambassador believed that the flags of both Portugal and Brazil would be flown side by side.[942]

[937] III, 682.
[938] III, 683. This message was not translated until March 21, 1945.
[939] III, 684.
[940] III, 685.
[941] III, 686.
[942] III, 687.

[195]

(c) Chile

360. Tokyo Seeks American Equipment for Chilean Attache

On October 16, 1941 the Chief of the General Affairs Section in Tokyo directed the Japanese Embassy in Washington to send a shortwave radio set and a car to Chile by steamship, if possible. The General Affairs Section was to be advised of the cost of the freight charges and the time required for the trip. If the purchases could be made, Colonel Wake would bring the necessary money to the United States.[943]

361. Japan Attempts to Raise Money for Chilean Purchases

The problem of obtaining sufficient currency to purchase materials desired by Japan was acute in Chile. On August 20, 1941 Minister Yamagata advised Tokyo that Chilean firms had begun to demand advance payment on all exports of copper ore. Through the efforts of the Argentina government and German banks, Mr. Yamagata reported that he had been able to obtain enough money to conclude one contract, but the possibility of raising $250,000 for the purchase of other ores and wool seemed slight at the present time. Permission was requested to begin negotiations to obtain $100,000 from a German bank with the Yokohama Specie Bank furnishing a guarantee.

According to the Japanese Minister, all important persons in Chile, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had assumed a friendly attitude toward Japan but none was willing to lend money at Chile's risk.[944]

362. Japan Plans to Take Advantage of Anti-American Feeling in Chile

Unlike other South American countries, Chile, according to Minister Yamagata, had not instituted anti-Japanese restrictions. Since Chile was the chief exporter of copper, tin and nitrates to the United States, Minister Yamagata felt that its pro-Japanese feeling and undercurrent of anti-Americanism should be used to advantage in maintaining the neutrality of Chile, and strengthen opposition to the United States.[945]

To obtain the greatest results at the least cost, Minister Yamagata suggested that the following plan for the carrying out of this policy via newspaper, radio, motion pictures, lectures, and printed matter be instituted in September. An increased allotment of 15,5000 yen would be required for a seven months period, and should be sent along with the second installment. The plan included:

1. The increase of 500 yen a month for the transfer of daily broadcasts from the old station to a new broadcasting unit, said to be the highest powered station in South America.

2. The increase of 900 yen a month for reprinting Domei news in El Chileno, the morning newspaper with an anti-American editorial policy.[946]

Since Minister Yamagata also considered the possibility of interesting Diario Illustrado and El Chileno in reprinting a series of impressions from Japan, Tokyo was requested to have Domei send dispatches once a week and to inform the Santiago office beforehand regarding the time and wave length of the broadcasts.[947]

On October 10, 1941 Minister Yamagata, referring to a statement by United States correspondents in the local papers which announced that friendly talks had been initiated between Japan and Chile, requested Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire permission to release full details of the conversations.[948]

[943] III, 688.
[944] III, 689.
[945] III, 690.
[946] III, 691.
[947] III, 692.
[948] III, 693.